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ARTHUR

L.

GEORGE*

A Practical and Theoretical Analysis of
Service of Process under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
I. Introduction
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 1 established a

special set of rules for serving process2 upon foreign states. 3 Prior to the
FSIA, no special statutory provisions existed for serving foreign states,4
which often led plaintiffs to attach U.S. assets of the foreign state in order to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant state. 5 This situation
*Associate, Baker & McKenzie, Washington, D.C.
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 16021611 (1976).
2. Id. §§ 1605(b), 1608. The service provisions of the FSIA have been discussed in the
following publications: Ascencio & Dry, An Assessment of the Service Provisionsof the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 8 J. OF LEGIS. 230 (1981); Carl, Suing Foreign Governments
in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw.
L.J. 1009, 1022-28 (1979); Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations:
Sovereign Immunity, Part IV, 1980 CoM. L.J. 364, 370-71 (1980); Kane, Suing Foreign
Sovereigns: A ProceduralCompass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 397-402 (1982); SMIT, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A PLEA FOR DRASTIC SURGERY, 1980 AM. Soc'v INT'L L.
PROC. 49, 66 (1980); Note, Service of Process Under The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976: The Arguments for Exclusivity, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 357 (1981); Note, Sovereign
Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18
HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 443-46 (1977).
3. The FSIA defines a "foreign state" as including a political subdivision of a foreign state or
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in § 1603(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)
(1976). See infra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning of "agency or
instrumentality."
4. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House
Report]; S. REP. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 9, 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report]. See generally Miller, Service of Process on State, Local, and Foreign Governments
Under Rule 4, FederalRules of Civil Procedure-Some Unfinished Business for the Rulemakers,
46 F.R.D. 101, 121-39 (1969). Apparently, this gap existed because the FederalRules of Civil
Procedurewere established prior to the advent of restrictive sovereign immunity, so there was
no need to provide for service upon foreign states, id. at 122, and Congress never attempted to
fill the gap afterwards, id. at 127.
5. House Report, supra note 4, at 26; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 26.
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resulted in foreign relations tensions,6 which sometimes made the State
Department's sovereign immunity determinations political as well as legal
decisions. 7 Moreover, the attached assets often could not be used to satsify a
resulting judgment.8
The FSIA's service provisions were designed to eliminate these problems9
and provide an adequate means of commencing suit against foreign states.
Specifically, the FSIA eliminated prejudgment attachment in most suits
against foreign states.'

Consequently, it eliminated quasi in rem jurisdic-

tion and substituted specific methods of service by which to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant state." Other provisions of
2 the
FSIA provide for post-judgment attachment to satisfy a judgment.'
Because the FSIA's service provisions are complex, the sufficiency of
service frequently becomes an initial issue in lawsuits against foreign
states. 13 Although the number of reported opinions dealing with the sufficiency of service is small, 14 enough cases have dealt with the FSIA's service
6. House Report, supra note 4, at 27; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 27; see, e.g., Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
7. See House Report, supra note 4, at 7; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9.
8. See Immunities of Foreign States, Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcommittee on
Claims and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44
(1973) (State and Justice Dep't section-by-section analysis). The Department of State had
taken the position that although attachment of a foreign state's property was not prohibited if
the state was not immune from suit, the property so attached could not be retained to satisfy a
judgment because the property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution even if the
sovereign is not immune from suit. Id.; see Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka National Corp, 222
N.Y.S.2d 128,134 (App. Div. 1961); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086,
192 N.Y.S. 469, 472 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cy. 1959). Judgments so obtained simply formed a
basis for recognition and enforcement abroad or a diplomatic claim by the State Department on
the claimant's behalf. Carl, supra note 2, at 1014; von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. 34, 42-43 (1978).
9. House Report, supra note 4, at 8, 26; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 9, 25.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1620(d) (1976). The FSIA permits pre-judgment attachment if the
foreign state has waived its immunity therefrom and the purpose of such attachment is to secure
satisfaction of an ultimate judgment rather than to obtain jurisdiction. Carl, supra note 2, at
1042.
11. House Report,supra note 4, at 8; Senate Report,supra note 4, at9;see28 U.S.C. § 1608
(1976).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1976).
13. The common points of contention include the sufficiency of the translations required in
§ 1608(a)(3) and (b)(3) and whether all the required documents were ever sent. See infra notes
197-205 and accompanying text.
14. Many service problems are resolved at an early stage because the plaintiff need only
re-serve the documents as corrected in order to commence suit.
The reported decisions dealing with the FSIA's service provisions at this writing are: Alberti
v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne, 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983); Harris Corp. v. National
Iranian Radio and Tel., 691 F.2d 1344, 1352 (1lth Cir. 1982); Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653
F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala.
1982), vacated mem. op. (Feb. 27, 1984), dismissed (Oct. 26, 1984); International Schools Serv.
v. tran, 505 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1981); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F.
Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United Euram v. Union of Soviet Socialist
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provisions to give an indication of what the courts believe constitutes compliance and to expose problem areas in which the statute or its administration 15 could be improved.
This article analyzes compliance with the service provisions of the FSIA
and evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. It first outlines the permissible methods of service from a practitioner's perspective. It then examines

case law and analyzes what should constitute compliance with the FSIA's
service provisions. Finally, the article makes some modest proposals for
improving service upon foreign states under the FSIA.
II. The FSIA's Service Provisions

A.

IN GENERAL

Section 1608 sets forth the exclusive provisions for service upon foreign
states and their instrumentalities. 16 Separate provisions exist for service on
(1) foreign states and their political subdivisions 17 and (2) a foreign state's
agencies and instrumentalities.1 8 In order to serve the defendant, therefore,
a claimant must determine into which category the defendant falls. Fortunately, the statute's definition of an agency or instrumentality 19 of a foreign
state has caused courts little difficulty. 20 In case of doubt, a claimant should
serve the defendant according to both sets of provisions.
Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); 40 D 6262 Realty Corp. v. United Arab
Emirates, 447 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), Gray v. Permanent Mission, 443 F. Supp. 816
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem., 508 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978). Two significant unreported
decisions are: In re Related Iranian Cases, No. C-79-3542 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1980); Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social Security Organization of the Government of Iran, No.
CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979).
15. Service upon foreign states is administered by the State Department pursuant to the
FSIA and regulations published at 22 C.F.R. part 93 (1983).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976); House Report, supra note 4, at 23; Senate Report, supra note 4,
at 23. The rules also apply to filing an answer or other responsive pleading and to obtaining a
default judgment. House Report, supra note 4, at 23; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 23.
Section 1605(b) also contains certain service provisions for admiralty suits brought to enforce a
maritime lien. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (1976).
18. Id. § 1608(b).
19. Id. § 1603(b). Section 1603(b) provides:
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c)
and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
Id.
20. See, e.g., Gray v. Permanent Mission, 443 F. Supp. 816, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd
mer., 508 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (held a foreign state's United Nation's mission to be a
foreign state and not an agency or instrumentality).
WINTER 1985

52

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Each set of provisions contains a hierarchical scheme of service methods. 2 1 Thus, a plaintiff's attorney must proceed down the list and either

determine that an antecedent method is inapplicable or exhaust it before
moving on to the next one.
B.

SERVICE UPON A FOREIGN STATE OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISION

There are four permissible methods of service upon foreign states or
political subdivisions. The first and preferred method is by delivery of a copy
of the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement
for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political

subdivision. 2 2 This provision is designed to encourage potential plaintiffs
and foreign states to agree upon a procedure for service. 2 3
Whether this purpose is being achieved is unclear; no reported case under
the FSIA evidences such a private method of service. It is advisable for the
drafting attorney to provide for a method of service if convenience in
litigation is likely to be in the client's interest. Since such a provision itself

may suffice to waive immunity, 24 however, it may not be possible to specify a
method outside the context of an express waiver. The parties should specify

a number of alternate methods of serving the documents, preferably in a
hierarchy, sufficient to cover all possible contingencies. Normally, the foreign state should designate an agent, and preferably more than one, to
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)-(b) (1976); House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra
note 4, at 23.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1) (1976).
23. House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 23.
24. The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that an agreement to arbitrate or the
presence of a choice-of-law clause suffices to waive sovereign immunity. House Report, supra
note 4, at 18; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 18. The courts, however, appear to have limited
such waiver to agreements to arbitrate in the United States, apparently on the ground that the
parties contemplated enforcement of the arbitration agreement in U.S. courts if necessary in
such cases, and no such recourse is necessary when the arbitration is to occur elsewhere.
Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281,1285 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (in damage actions,
clauses that do not specify arbitration in United States are not waivers of immunity); e.g.,
Paterson Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd. v. Compania United Arrow, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 621,624 & n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (agreement to arbitrate in defendant state's territory not waiver of immunity);
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 987-88 (N.D. I11.
1980). Thus, an arrangement made for service in the United States also would probably waive
immunity. In Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico S.A., 528 F.
Supp. 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), however, the court concluded that the appointment of the New
York Secretary of State to receive process did not waive sovereign immunity, stating: "At
most, such an appointment may waive objections to personal jurisdiction. It cannot be construed to waive objections to the subject matter jurisdiction of any court, nor to waive
affirmative defenses, like sovereign immunity, which may be available in particular suits." Id.
at 1346. This result seems erroneous for the following reasons: the same considerations would
apply to agreements to arbitrate, which are considered waivers, because it ignores the peculiar
relationship between subject matter and personal jurisdiction in the FSIA; and a service
arrangement would not be made unless the parties believed that suit could be brought upon the
contract. Moreover, even in the face of a purported waiver of subject matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the case when the lack thereof becomes apparent.
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receive service. To ensure receipt of the papers, at least one of the agents
should be situated in the United States, and any others should be variously
located in the foreign state's bureaucracy and be equipped to receive service
by various modern methods of telecommunication, such as telex, telecopy,
and modern air delivery services.
Finally, it is important to appreciate that section 1608(a)(1) only gives the
parties latitude to choose methods of service; the content of the documents
served is still governed by the FSIA, the applicable principles of pleading,
and due process.
The second method of service, available only if no special arrangement
exists, is by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint pursuant
to an applicable 25 international convention on the service of judicial
documents. 26 The only such convention to which the United States is a party
is the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents.27 Under the Convention, service normally occurs by a judicial
officer or other authority serving the documents upon a designated central
authority in the receiving state, which then serves the documents pursuant
to the legally prescribed methods for domestic suits or by a particular
method requested by the applicant if it is consistent with the receiving state's
law. 28 In addition, a person may mail judicial documents directly to persons
25. For an international convention to apply, both the United States and the foreign state
must be parties to the convention. House Report, supra note 4, at 25; Senate Report, supra
note 4, at 23.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2) (1976).
27. 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (1969). The Hague Convention governs service in suits
against the following foreign states unless there is a special service arrangement: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, The United Arab Republic, The United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. Id. 20 U.S.T. at
367-69. This list is updated in TREATIES INFORCE and the annotations to Federal Rule 4 in 28
U.S.C.A.
28. Id. arts. 2-3, 5, 20 U.S.T. at 362. Article 5 provides:
The Central. Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall
arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either(a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic
actions upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed.
Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the document may always
be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily.
If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the Central Authority may
require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the
official languages of the State addressed.
That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which contains a
summary of the document to be served, shall be served with the document.
Id. art. 5, 20 U.S.T. at 362-63. Compatibility with the receiving state's internal law under
subsection (b) is presumed unless the requested method is affirmatively prohibited. See infra
note 185 and accompanying text. Service may not be disallowed merely because the receiving
state's law does not permit the cause of action. Hague Convention, art. 13, 20 U.S.T. at 364.
WINTER 1985
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abroad, or judicial officers or other officials of the sending state may effect
service directly through their counterparts in the receiving state. 29 Finally,
each contracting state may use consular channels and, in exceptional circumstances, diplomatic channels to forward service documents
to those
30
authorities designated by the receiving state for such purpose.
The third and most common method of serving foreign states is sending
the summons, complaint, and a "notice of suit, ' ' 31 together with a translation of each into the foreign state's official language, by return receipt mail,
to be sent by the court
clerk to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of
32
the foreign state.

Whenever a notice of suit is required, a copy of the FSIA must be attached
as part thereof, meaning that it too must be translated.3 3 If this method has
not succeeded within thirty days, service can be made by the fourth method.
Under this method the claimant sends two copies of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit, each translated into the foreign state's official
language, by return receipt mail to be addressed by the court clerk to the

State Department's Director of Overseas Citizens Services,34 who then
transmits one of the copies through diplomatic channels 35 and sends the
court clerk a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers
were transmitted.3 6
C.

SERVICE UPON A STATE AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY

The provisions for service upon a state agency or instrumentality are set
29. Id., art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
30. Id., art. 9, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
31. A "notice of suit," or of a default judgment, is a short summary of the nature of the suit
containing (1) the title of the proceeding, including the docket number, (2) the name of the
court, (3) the name of the foreign state or political subdivision concerned, (4) the nature of the
documents served (e.g., Summons and Complaint; Default Judgment), (5) a statement of the
nature and purpose of the proceedings, including why the foreign state or political subdivision
has been named and the relief requested, and (6) the date of the default judgment if that is what
is being served. 22 C.F.R. part 93, annex. See generally House Report, supra note 4, at 11,
24-25; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 7, 24.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) (1976). This procedure is based on FED. R. CIV. PROC. 4(i)(2)(D).
House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 24.
33. See 22 C.F.R. § 93.2(e) (1983).
34. On January 8, 1979, Overseas Citizens Services succeeded to the functions of the former
Office of Special Consular Services, the sub-agency still specified in the statute.
35. Transmittal by "diplomatic channels" means that the State Department pouches a copy
to the U.S. embassy in the foreign state, which then prepares a diplomatic note of transmittal to
deliver with the other papers to the appropriate official at the foreign state's ministry of foreign
affairs. The Department then returns to the court the diplomatic note used in transmitting the
papers. Alternatively, the State Department could transmit the papers to the foreign state's
embassy in Washington, D.C. House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra note 4,
at 24.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) (1976). The foreign state need not accept the papers for such
transmittal to be valid; the foreign state need only have received actual notice of the suit by
receiving the papers sent as specified. House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra
note 4, at 24.
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forth in section 1608(b). 37 These provisions also embody a hierarchical
scheme, but are more numerous and offer more flexibility than those of
section 1608(a).
First, like section 1608(a)(1), and for the same reasons, section 1608(b)(1)
gives first priority to service pursuant to a special arrangement between the
parties. It should be easier to come to such an arrangement with an agency
or instrumentality than with the foreign state itself because most such
entities operate as private commercial entities and often waive immunity to
suit as a condition to a transaction. In the context of such a waiver, providing
for a method of service is not a significant concession and is normally done.
The second method actually consists of two alternatives. A copy of the
summons and complaint must be delivered either (1) to an officer, managing
or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive process in the United States or (2) in accordance with an applicable
international convention on service of judicial documents. 38 No hierarchy
between the two alternatives is given; thus, it is unclear what the preferable
method of service is if the agency or instrumentality itself could be served
under the Convention and its officers or agents could also be served in the
United States. The issue is partially resolved by looking at the manner in
which the agent is appointed. If it is done by the contract governing the
transaction under which the claim arises, subsection (b)(1) would apply
because the appointment would constitute a special service arrangement. In
this situation, section 1608(b)(2) would not apply.
If no officer or agent is present in the United States, of course, then only
the Convention could apply. The only situation open to question, therefore,
is when merely an officer or managing or general agent is present in the
United States and the contract does not call for service upon such officer or
agent. In these circumstances serving either the officer or agent or the
agency or instrumentality would be permissible because subsection (b)(2)
presents them in the form of options, though serving the U.S. agent appears
preferable because it more closely resembles service under section
1608(b)(1). Serving the officer or agent in the United States also is preferable from a strategic standpoint because it is easier and less expensive, and
actual receipt of the documents is more likely.
Subsection (b)(3) contains three more options if service is not possible by
the above methods. These three methods are not in a preferential hierarchy;
the plaintiff may select any one them. Each requires, however, that the
summons and complaint be translated into the foreign state's official
language. 39 No notice of suit need be included.
Under the first of these options, the plaintiff may have the court send a
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (1976).
38. Id.§ 1608(b)(2).
39. Id.§ 1608(b)(3).
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letter rogatory4° and then serve the agency or instrumentality in accordance
with the foreign state or political subdivision's response to it. 41 Second, the
plaintiff may simply transmit the documents by any form of mail requiring a
signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched to the defendant by the court
clerk. 42 This is the most common method of the three. Finally, service may
be accomplished by a method directed by the court, so long as it is consistent
with the law of the place where service is to be made, 43 which is not
necessarily that of the foreign state. Service by court order must be regarded
as a last resort because it calls for the exercise of discretion, causes uncertainty, and may irritate foreign states, even though the method chosen is not
prohibited by its law. When this option is used, counsel should examine the
possibility of requesting service pursuant to state law, Federal Rule 4, or
local rules of service developed under the authority of Federal Rule 83.
D.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE PROVISIONS

1. Time of Service

The time at which service is deemed to have been made is important for
statute-of-limitations purposes and for determining when an answer or
other responsive pleading must be filed. Section 1608(c) provides that

service under subsection (a)(4) occurs as of the date of transmittal indicated
in the certified copy of the diplomatic note.4" In all other cases, service is
deemed to have occurred as indicated in the certification, signed postal
receipt, or other applicable proof of service.
2. Time to Answer or Reply

In normal federal cases, the defendant is given twenty days in which to file
its answer or other responsive pleading unless an extension is granted.46 The
FSIA, however, gives foreign states sixty days.47 This longer period may be
designed in part to make the suit less offensive and to give the defendant
40. A letter rogatory, or letter of request, is the medium whereby one country, speaking
through its courts, requests another country's courts to assist the administration of justice in the
former country through their own procedures. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979). See
generally 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 204-16 (1968).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3)(A) (1976).

42. Id. § 1608(b)(3)(B).
43. Id. § 1608(b)(3)(C). At least two pre-FSIA decisions permitted ad hoc service methods
under rule 83 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs.,
Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 1975); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d
103, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966) (relying upon local court rules established
under rule 83). No post-FSIA decision has needed to rely explicitly upon rule 83, though one
court cited the above cases in permitting court-ordered service upon the state of Iran under rule
4. In re Related Iranian Cases, No. C-79-3542 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1980).

44. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(c)(1) (1976).
45. Id. § 1608(c)(2).
46. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(a).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d) (1976). This period may be extended as well.
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state time to formulate any sovereign immunity defense. Since the U.S.
government has sixty days to respond when it is sued,48 however, it may be
that Congress simply decided to give foreign states equal treatment. 49
The sixty-day response period must be mentioned in both the summons
and the notice of suit where required. Surprisingly, plaintiffs occasionally
fail to comply with this requirement. 50 This defect may be remedied by
serving the summons and notice of suit again with the correct period specified.
3. Service of Entries of Default and Default Judgments

Section 1608(e) requires that once a claimant establishes its right to relief
by evidence satisfactory to the court and a default judgment is entered, a
copy of such judgment must be sent to the foreign state in the manner
prescribed for service in subsections (a) and (b). 5 t Presumably, the method
would be the same as that originally used to serve process, unless this
method has become impracticable. Notice of an entry of default must also be
served, but the evidentiary standard of section 1608(e) does not apply.
4. Service Provisionsfor Admiralty Suits
Brought to Enforce Maritime Liens

Satisfaction of section 1605(b)'s special service provisions will render an
admiralty action brought to enforce a maritime lien an in personam claim up
to the value of the vessel or cargo upon which the lien arose. 52 Much as
Congress designed section 1608 to render pre-judgment attachments unnecessary, section 1605(b) is designed to avoid the need to arrest
a foreign
53
state's vessel or cargo in order to commence suit against it.
A plaintiff must fulfill two requirements under section 1605(b). First, a
copy of the summons and complaint must be delivered to the person, or such
person's agent, who is in possession of the subject vessel or cargo. 54 If the
vessel or cargo is arrested or attached pursuant to process obtained by the
plaintiff, then the plaintiff loses its in personam remedy and the foreign state
is entitled to immunity. 55 If, however, the plaintiff was unaware that the
48. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(a).
49. See House Report, supra note 4, at 25; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 25.
50. This occurred in Jackson. See Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Relief
from Judgment by Default and Motion to Dismiss, at 55-56, Jackson v. People's Republic of
China, mem. op. (Feb. 27, 1982) (order setting aside default judgment).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976).
52. Id. § 1605(b). The value of the vessel or cargo is determined as of the time notice of the
suit is served under subsection (b)(1). Id.
53. House Report, supra note 4, at 21; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 21. Section 1605(b)
does not preclude suit pursuant to § 1605(a), nor would it preclude a subsequent action under
§ 1605(a) to recover the amount by which the value of the maritime lien exceeds the recovery in
the first action.
54. Id. § 1605(b)(2).
55. Id.
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vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, serving the process of arrest
will constitute valid notice.5 6
Second, notice to the foreign state must also be initiated 57 as provided in
section 1608 within ten days of when notice was delivered to the person in
possession of the vessel or cargo.5 8 If the plaintiff is unaware of the foreign
state's interest, however, the ten-day period does not begin running until the

plaintiff does become aware of it. 59 This second requirement is designed to
ensure that the foreign state receives prompt and actual notice of the suit in
the event the copies served upon the master or his agent fail to reach the
foreign state. 6' This danger arises because61shipmasters are often employed
by charterers rather than by shipowners.

The case of Velidor v. LIPIG Benghazi,6 2 illustrates the working of section
1605(b) and its interrelationship with sections 1605(a) and 1608. In Velidor,
dissatisfied Yugoslavian seamen demanded wages owed under the Seamen's
Wage Act 63 upon the Benghazi's docking in the United States. 64 When
payment was not forthcoming, they had the ship arrested to satisfy their
claims. 65 The plaintiffs had served only the master and not also the foreign
state as required by section 1605(b)(2), because they did not know that the
vessel was owned by a state entity.6 6 The owner of the vessel, Compagnie
56. Id. As a practical matter, such unawareness will be rare because the flag of the vessel, the
circumstances giving rise to the maritime lien, and the information in ship registries kept in U.S.
ports should make known the ownership of at least the vessel, if not the cargo. House Report,
supra note 4, at 22; Senate Report, supranote 4, at 21. Reliance upon such a registry which did
not disclose a foreign state's ownership, however, would be prima facie evidence of unawareness. House Report, supra note 4, at 22; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 21. This was the case in
Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), in which the Lloyds Register indicated
that a shipping company other than the actual state-owned company was the owner. Id. at 815
n.3. In addition, other ships in the subject vessel's fleet flew another state's flag. Id. The district
court also apparently accepted these facts as evidence of unawareness. Id. Accordingly, the
district court held that it had jurisdiction under § 1605(b). Id. at 815. Later proceedings at the
district level made this holding irrelevant, as the cause of action was held to be proper only
under § 1605(a). Id. at 816. Absent such circumstances, unawareness normally would be
established by affidavit. House Report, supra note 4, at 22; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 21.
57. Whether the notice actually must be received within the ten days, or whether it must be
received at all is not specified in the statute. The committee reports state only that this notice
requirement to ensure that the state receives "prompt notice" of the lawsuit. House Report,
supra note 4, at 22; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 22. Thus, it appears that the notice need only
be dispatched within the ten days but that it must be received within a reasonable time.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(2) (1976).
59. Id.

60. House Report, supra note 4, at 22; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 22.
61. Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 821 (3d Cir. 1981).
62. Id.
63. The Seamen's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 596-597 (1976), gives seamen, American or
foreign, the right to be paid specified percentages of their wages due upon arrival in a U.S. port
where cargo is unloaded. To enforce this right, seamen may bring actions in U.S. courts and
may arrest their vessel to satisfy their claims. Id. § 597.
64. 653 F.2d at 814.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 815-16 & n.3.
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Algero-Libyenne de Transport Maritime (CALTRAM), then asserted its
status as an agency or instrumentality of Algeria and Libya and demanded

that the arrests be lifted because of the service defect. 67 The plaintiffs
admitted that service was improper for purposes of a maritime claim under

section 1605(b), but asserted that they had been unaware of the ship's
sovereign ownership, that their claim could also be cognizable under
6s
1605(a)(2), and that, accordingly, section 1608(b)(2) governed service.

Sections 1605(b) and 1608(b)(2) were satisfied, the plaintiffs argued, because the master was the foreign state's agent, which meant that the foreign
state's "officer ....
managing or general agent" had been served in conformity with section 1608(b)(2). 69

The court agreed with the plaintiffs' arguments. Relying upon the committee reports' reminders that claims could lie both under section 1605(a)

and 1605(b), 70 the court first found that the defendants were engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States 7 1 and that the plaintiffs' claims
arose from this activity. 72 The court then looked to section 1608(b)(2) and

held that under agency principles of maritime law, a ship's master is regarded as the owner's agent and representative and, therefore, that the

master was an officer, general or special agent for accepting process within
the meaning of section 1608(b)(2). 73

The Third Circuit's decision in Velidor confirmed the option of proceeding under either section 1605(b) or section 1605(a) when the individual
requirements of either can be met. As the court pointed out, 74 this result
comports with Congress' intent that, in order to make it easier for private
plaintiffs to commence suit upon foreign entities, section 1605(b) should not
67. Id. at 814-16.
68. Id. at 816.
69. See id. at 820-21.
70. Id. at 819.
71. 653 F.2d at 819. Section 1605(a)(2) disallows a claim of sovereign immunity for claims
arising from commercial activities in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). A
commercial activity is defined in § 1603(d) as a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. Id. § 1603(d). The commercial character of an activity
is determined by examining its inherent nature rather than its purpose. Id. Such activity is
"carried on in the United States" if it has "substantial contact" with the United States. Id.
§ 1603(e); see also id. § 1605(a)(2) ("commercial activity" within § 1605(a)(2) may be one
carried on in the United States, an act in connection with a commercial activity carried on
elsewhere, or an act outside U.S. territory in connection with a commercial activity conducted
elsewhere but having a direct effect in the United States, all may constitute commercial
activities within § 1605(a)(2)).
72. 653 F.2d at 820. Section 1605(a)(2) requires that the claim be "based upon" a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
This statutory requirement reflects the minimum contacts requirement that the lawsuit arise
from the alleged minimum contacts. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
73. 653 F.2d at 821.
74. Id.
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preclude suit under other sections of the FSIA simply because that section's

requirements can be met. 75 The court's conclusion on this point, however,
should not be read to suggest that less than literal compliance with the
statute is sufficient so long as the foreign state receives actual notice. The
plaintiffs in Velidor met the literal requirements of section 1608(b)(2), and
the only question was whether they were required to proceed exclusively
under section 1605(b).
III. Compliance with the FSIA's Service Provisions
A.

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Determining whether personal jurisdiction 76 has been obtained over a
defendant requires a two-step analysis. First, one must determine whether
the technique of service used was permitted by the applicable statute. When
a foreign state is the defendant, this statute is the FSIA. Second, if the first
requirement is satisfied it is still necessary to see whether the method of
service comported with the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. This
requirement is met if, under the circumstances, the chosen method of
service was reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice and an
opportunity to appear and defend. 77

Under this analysis, literal compliance with the statute does not necessarily constitute adequate service. Conversely, service may be invalid because the FSIA's provisions were not complied with, even though the
defendant received actual notice and appeared in court. None of the FSIA's
75. House Report, supra note 4, at 22; Senate Report, supra note 4, 22.
76. Under the scheme of the FSIA, personal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) technically is not acquired unless one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies. House
Report, supra note 4, at 23; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 23. The inquiry performed in
determining the applicability of an exception, however, involves considerations normally
associated with subject matter jurisdiction because the court is determining whether the case is
of the type it is permitted to adjudicate under federal statutes and the Constitution.
As with personal jurisdiction, the question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
over a case has both constitutional and statutory dimensions. One must first determine whether
the case falls within article III's grant of federal judicial power, and second whether the case is
embraced by the terms of a statute. See Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Republic of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981). Under the scheme of the FSIA, these requirements also must
be met before personal jurisdiction is acquired over a foreign state. The second of these
requirements is met if an exception applies. If an exception applies, the article III requirement
should be met in nearly every case because most cases are brought under § 1605(a)(2) and the
FSIA's jurisdictional standard under §§ 1603(d)-(e) and 1605(a)(2) is more demanding than
that of due process. In cases brought under other exceptions a genuine due process issue might
arise.
77. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
78. The constitutional standard is built into the three options in § 1608(b)(3), however,
because the subsection requires that the option employed must be reasonably calculated to give
actual notice. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3) (1976). Thus, satisfying this provision also satisfies due
process.
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service provisions appear facially unconstitutional; most of them are lifted in
some form from the previously upheld provisions of rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 79 and in any event appear reasonably calculated to
give actual notice if complied with and employed in the appropriate factual
situations. Indeed, the Mullane standard8 0 is written into section 1608(b)(3).
It appears that, outside a clear non-compliance with the statute, a constitutional question could arise only if (1) the plaintiff chooses and a court
approves a technique under section 1608(b)(3) that under the facts makes
actual notice too unlikely, 8' (2) none of the means of serving a foreign state
or political subdivision under section 1608(a) applies or has worked, as
occurred in several cases brought against Iran, 82 and a deficient nonstatutory technique is fashioned or (3) the translations required under some
subsections are so affirmatively
misleading that reasonable notice cannot be
83
deemed to have been given.
The following sections analyze, in the context of the case law, compliance
with the FSIA's service provisions. The translation problem is discussed
separately because of its uniqueness and because it has been addressed in
only one case to date.

B.

THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE

FSIA's

SERVICE PROVISIONS

1. Compliance in General
Except for cases involving exceptional facts, the courts have required
strict compliance with the terms of the FSIA's service provisions. This result
appears proper because tolerating less than full compliance threatens the
uniformity of results that Congress sought to achieve and risks the type of
foreign relations complications that Congress sought to eliminate when
passing the statute.
The need for strictness has been upheld in several cases. In 40 D 6262
Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates,8 4 the plaintiffs attempted to serve a
foreign state under section 1608(a) 85 merely by affixing a "notice of petition" to the U.S. realty in question and mailing a copy to the Permanent
Mission of the United Arab Emirates Government. 86 This attempt at service
79. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 4(i).

80. See supra text accompanying note 77.
81. As noted supra note 76, meeting § 1608(b)(3) will automatically satisfy the Constitution.
Since the standard ultimately employed is that of due process, it is appropriate to view
compliance with this subsection in constitutional terms.
82. See infra notes 142-81 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
84. 447 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
85. The opinion leaves unclear what subsection the plaintiffs intended to satisfy.
86. Id. at 711.
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fell far outside any provision of section 1608(a) 87 and, accordingly, was held
invalid. 88 Relying upon the FSIA's legislative history, the court also noted
that service upon an embassy by mail is precluded by the Act8 9 and violates
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 9" Since the plaintiffs'
attempt at service in this case did not even approach compliance, however,
the decision does not squarely stand for either a strict or loose approach to
compliance.
In a similar case, Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carre, the
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs' service of the papers upon the
Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States was inadequate. 9 Relying
upon the committee reports' statement that mailing the complaint and
summons to a foreign mission would violate the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations and thus be precluded under the FSIA,9 2 the court
properly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the ambassador could be
construed as the head of the ministry of foreign affairs under section
1608(a)(3). 93 Although the Alberti court reached the proper result, it applied the wrong subsection of section 1608. Since the defendant was an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, service should have been made
under section 1608(b)(3), not section 1608(a)(3). The opinion never mentioned that the plaintiffs were attempting to employ the wrong subsection,
so that even if they had satisfied it, service still would have been improper.
An analogous situation with a greater degree of compliance existed in
Gray v. PermanentMission.94 In that case, the plaintiff brought a foreclosure action against the Congo's Mission to the United Nations, and sought to
serve it by serving an untranslated summons and complaint upon the Mission's "secretary." ' 95 Since this procedure clearly did not meet any method
87. Service was clearly not pursuant to an agreement, so § 1608(a)(1) was inapplicable. The
defendant was not a party to the Hague Convention, so § 1608(a)(2) did not apply. Sections
1608(a)(3) and (4) could not have been satisfied because these subsections require translated
copies of the complaint, summons, and notice of suit, none of which were provided.
88. Id. at 711.
89. Id. at 712 (citing House Report, supra note 4, at 24-25).
90. 447 F. Supp. at 712 n.3; see Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22(1),
23 U.S.T. 2227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502 (1972). The Vienna Convention states:
The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving state may not
enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
Id. Whether serving an embassy by mail would violate article 22(1) was brought to the State
Department's attention by concerned foreign states, who claimed that the 1973 bill, which
allowed such service, would violate the Convention. 71 DEP'T ST. BULL. 458 (1974). The
Department agreed, the bill was amended, and Congress wrote this conclusion into the
legislative history. See House Report, supra note 4, at 26; Senate Report, supra note 4, at
25-26.
91. 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 253.
93. Id.; see supra note 90.
94. 443 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 508 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978). The decision is
noted in Comment, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 841 (1981).
95. 443 F. Supp. at 818.
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contained in section 1608(a), the plaintiff argued that the Mission was an
agency or instrumentality and that service was proper under section
1608(b)(2) because the secretary was an officer or agent thereof. 96 The court
rejected this argument, holding that the mission was a foreign state and not
an agency or instrumentality, which meant that section 1608(b) did not
apply. 97 The court suggested that in any event, service upon "defendant's
secretary" too vaguely identified the person intended to be served under
section 1608(b)(2) to satisfy that section, and further indicated that sich a
person probably would not have the degree of authority necessary to be the
type of person contemplated by the section.9 8 Finally, the court concluded
that since notice was in English and delivered only to "defendant's secretary," since the summons and complaint were drawn up on a pre-printed
legal form, and since the defendants did not employ an attorney or take
other legal actions until threatened with eviction, it was "obvious that the
officials of the Congo Mission did not understand their rights under American law." 99 This statement suggests that the court considered the service to
have violated not only the FSIA, but also due process.
Despite the plaintiff's obvious non-compliance with the FSIA, however,
the court went beyond the holding necessitated by the facts t00 and ruled that
strict compliance with the statute is required: "Every mode of service
prescribed by the statute assumes either prior agreement between a foreign
state and the American authorities ...

or mandates strict attention to the

linguistic and diplomatic problems inherent in such situations. " ' 1 This
statement is irreproachable. The court's treatment of section 1608(b)(2),
however, bears more discussion. First, in suggesting that serving someone
designated "defendant's secretary" would be too vague a designation to
comply with section 1608(b)(2), the court appears to have gone too far and
confused the fact of serving the proper person with labels. Section
1608(b)(2) by its terms requires only that an officer or agent of the defendant
agency or instrumentality be served, not that such person's specific title be
designated. Therefore, service upon such a person otherwise in compliance
96. Id. at 820.
97. Id. The court stated that it was hard to imagine a purer embodiment of a foreign state
than such a mission and cited the House Report's discussion of the FSIA's attachment
provisions, in which it was stated that diplomatic and consular missions are those of the foreign
state itself. Id.; see House Report, supra note 4, at 29.
98. 443 F.2d at 820 n.4. The court stated: "The plaintiff has stated only that service was
made on 'defendant's secretary.' This person is not identified more specifically and would not
appear to have the degree of authority contemplated by the statute." Id.
99. Id. at 821.
100. Apparently in reference to the plaintiff's dismal attempt at service, the court stated that
"informal" notification "clearly outside" the "obvious" requirements of the applicable statute
cannot substitute for those which meet those requirements. Id. at 821. This statement arguably
could be read as not requiring strict compliance, but the court appears to have been speaking in
the context of the facts rather than stating a general rule.
101. Id.
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with this section should be deemed satisfactory. Moreover, no comparable
requirement exists for service upon the officials or agents of domestic
corporations, partnerships, or unincorporated associations,10 2 and none of
the foreign relations considerations present when suing foreign states
appear to require a different rule under the FSIA. Requiring that the
person's specific position be set forth would be cumbersome and lead to too
many instances of good faith non-compliance with a statute designed to
make it easier for plaintiffs to commence suit, with no corresponding policy
benefit.
The court's conclusion that the person served at the Mission must possess
the type of authority that an official or agent under section 1608(b)(2) should
possess, however, appears sound. The court's focus upon authority indicates that one should apply general principles of agency to determine
whether the right person is being served. Agency principles are used under
section 1605(a)(5) to determine whether the tortfeasor is an official or agent
acting within the scope of employment. 10 3 The authority requirement also
appears in section 1605(b), 1 °4 and was applied in Velidor. There appears to
be no reason not to do the same under section 1608(b)(2).
The Velidor case also stands for a strict approach to compliance. In that
case, the court did not pause to invalidate service under section 1605(b)
because the foreign instrumentality itself had not been served in addition to
the master of the vessel, even though the instrumentality had actual
notice. 105 The court in Jackson v. People's Republic of China also spoke of
the need for strict compliance with the FSIA's service provisions, setting
aside its default judgment, inter alia, on the ground that the record did not
disclose that a translated copy of the summons was ever served. t06
The only court that permitted less than strict compliance with the methods
outlined in section 1608 is the Eleventh Circuit in Harris Corp. v. National
IranianRadio and Television. 107 In that case the plaintiff attempted to serve
the Iranian agency or instrumentality in several ways. t0 8 None of the
102. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 4(d)(3). The summons need only contain the name of the party
defendant. Id. 4(b).
103. Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983). Under
§ 1605(a)(5) the court would apply the agency law of the jurisdiction in which the claim arose,
id. at 1417, but under § 1608(b)(2) a court would be free to apply whatever agency law is
appropriate under the forum state's choice-of-law rules. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976).
105. 653 F.2d at 819; see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
106. No. 79-C-1272-E, slip. op. at 7-8 (Feb. 27, 1984), vacatingJackson v. People's Republic
of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (D. Ala. 1982).
107. 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982). Other cases permitted method of services wholly outside
the methods outlined in § 1608, but such cases raise the slightly different issue of the exclusivity
of § 1608's methods, not compliance with a specific method in § 1608.
108. The methods were: (1) telexing the summons and notice of suit and stating in the telex
that the pleadings would be as allowed in New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power
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methods used strictly complied with the statute, 109 though some succeeded
in giving the defendant actual notice." l0 No court-ordered service under
section 1608(b)(3)(C) was obtained. 1" Nevertheless, the court held that
service was sufficient because the defendant had received actual notice and
because the parts of section 1608(b) that had not been complied with, which
the court left unspecified, existed merely to ensure receipt of actual
notice. 112 The court never stated which method it found sufficient. Although
the court may have been frustrated by the difficulties in serving Iranian
entities at that time, this is no excuse for not requiring the plaintiff to obtain
court-ordered service under section 1608(b)(3)(C) if the other accepted
methods were unavailing. The decision is particularly regrettable because it
was decided after the cases discussed above had established uniform precedent to the contrary. That the court duly chastised the plaintiff for not
following the rules and warned future plaintiffs to do better11 3 offers scant
consolation.
2. Evaluating Compliance in Default Situations
The case of Jackson v. People's Republic of China,'"4 raises the issue of
compliance in a default situation. The court,. in upholding service in its
default judgment" 5 and in setting the default judgment aside,1 16 adverted to
the need for strict compliance with the FSIA's service provisions. In fact,
there existed numerous defects in service which arguably violated the
Act. "7 Since the PRC did not make an appearance, however, not all of
these defects were readily apparent to the court when it issued its default
judgment. Despite the disadvantage of not having the foreign state before
the court to point out service defects, the same requirements apply, and the
court is obligated to inquire into the sufficiency of service under these
standards. First, section 1608(e) provides that the court may not enter a
Generation and Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), (2) sending the
summons, complaint and notice of suit in English and Farsi by registered mail to the defendant
in Iran, as well as to the State Department for transmittal through diplomatic channels, and (3)
sending the documents to the defendant's attorneys. Id. at 1352 n.15.
109. Service by telex and through opposing counsel are not even mentioned in § 1608.
Service through diplomatic channels is allowed only against the foreign state itself, not state
agencies and instrumentalities.
110. Id. at 1352.
111. Id. at 1352 n. 16.
112. Id.at 1352.
113. Id.at 1352 n.16.
114. 550 F. Supp. 869 (D. Ala. 1982), vacated mem. op. at 7-8 (Feb. 27, 1984), dismissed
(Oct. 26, 1984).
115. 550 F. Supp. at 873.
116. Mem. op. at 7 (Feb. 27, 1984).
117. These defects included numerous translation errors, see infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text, and the apparent failure to send a translation of the summons. Also, the initial
summons erroneously gave the PRC 20 rather than 60 days to answer or respond, but this error
was subsequently corrected.
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default judgment unless it appears by "evidence satisfactory to the court"
that the claimant is entitled to relief.11 8 This section is largely unconstrued,
but its language and judicial practice under rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 1 9 from which this section is derived, 2 0 appear to place an
affirmative burden upon the claimant to demonstrate the validity of its cause
of action, which should include a showing that service complied with the
FSIA and due process. Second, foreign relations considerations also mandate that a default plaintiff not obtain a windfall when the FSIA is not
complied with. It could be argued that the foreign state could avoid such a
result merely by appearing. When states fail to appear, however, they

generally do so for principled reasons stemming from their interpretation of
international law, and thus litigation can be a significant irritant to U.S.
relations with that country. Such foreign relations considerations were a
major reason why the Jackson default judgment was set aside. 12t Therefore,
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976). This section provides:
(e) No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States or of a State
against a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A copy of any such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or
political subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in this section.
Id.
119. Normally, affirmative defenses are waived if not initially raised. In suits against the U.S.
government this rule is "subject to the provision of Rule 55(e)" that a plaintiff must establish his
claim by evidence satisfactory to the court. 2A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACtiCE 8.29, at
8-279 (1983). In Knouff v. United States, 74 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1977), for example, the
government's failure to file a timely answer led the plaintiff to argue that since under rule 8(d)
matters not denied in the answer are deemed admitted, the court need not test the plaintiffs
allegations. The court, however, recognized that a pleading rule should not determine the
court's duty to investigate the facts under rule 55(e). Such a result, stated the court, "would
clearly violate the mandate of Rule 55(e)." Id. at 557; cf. Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, 32
F.R.D. 190 (E.D. Va. 1963) (court obligated to consider "prima facie" meritorious defenses in
deciding whether to set aside entry of default under rule 55(c)).
120. House Report, supra note 4, at 26; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 25.
121. Mem. op. at 8-10 (Feb. 27, 1984), dismissed (Oct. 26, 1984). The default judgment
generated a reaction in the PRC sufficient to make it a topic of discussion during Secretary of
State Shultz's February 1983 visit to the PRC. According to Secretary Shultz:
Chairman Deng Xiaoping personally expressed to me the PRC Government's serious
concern about the default judgment in these proceedings and his apprehension that that
judgment was and would continue to be a major irritant in bilateral relations. Chairman
Deng vigorously stated his government's view that the PRC enjoys absolute immunity from
the processes of United States or other foreign courts and that the PRC Government is not
responsible for the particular debt at issue here of a predecessor Chinese government.
Chairman Deng indicated that the PRC regarded the Huguang bonds as especially objectionable because the PRC believes that foreign powers forced those bonds on a corrupt Imperial
Government and because the issuance of the bonds was one of the events that gave rise to the
Chinese Revolution of 1911.
7. At the February meetings, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xuegian also presented me
with an Aide Memoire setting forth China's views in this regard in writing. The Aide
Memoire recites China's position on sovereign immunity and liability for the debts at issue. It
specifically states (para. 3) that, if the default judgment is executed upon and Chinese
property in the United States is judicially attached, "the Chinese Government reserves the
right to take measures accordingly." The Aide Memoire further states (para. 4) that the
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in order to avoid making things worse it is important to require that the
FSIA be complied with to the letter.
3. Compliance with the FSIA's Translation Requirements

Section 1608(a)(3)-(4) requires that the summons, complaint, and notice
of suit be served upon the foreign state both in English and in the foreign
state's official language. The same requirement applies under section
1608(b)(3) with respect to the summons and complaint. In addition, a notice
of any default judgment must be translated if translations were required
when commencing suit. 122 Finally, the translator should certify the translation as accurate to the best of his or her knowledge. This translation
requirement bears some elaboration, as it poses numerous pitfalls to the
unwary.
The translation requirement is not needed to satisfy due process notice
requirements. No translations are required in suits against private foreign
persons under rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23 Rather,
like the notice of suit, it is purely a statutory requirement designed to further
reduce the chances of misunderstanding, make being hailed into U.S. court
as painless as possible, and generally minimize the frictions inherent in suits
124
against foreign states.

The cost of this courtesy, in both time and money, is high. Competent
translations are expensive; the cost of the translations in the OPEC suit
reportedly exceeded $12,000.125 Bearing this expense is necessary, however, to avoid litigation over the sufficiency of the translations. It is well
worth the attorney's time to find translators with a knowledge of legal
terminology in both English and the foreign state's language.
The translation must be into the foreign state's "official" language. The
Act, however, does not define this term. This gap could pose occasional
problems when the foreign state has no official language. This problem
arose recently, with a twist, in Jacksonv. People's Republic of China,126The

translations were made into Chinese, but used traditional, or classical,
United States Government should "take effective steps to stop the aggravation of events and
handle the case properly so that Sino-U.S. relations and normal trade and economic exchanges may not be impaired."
Declaration of George P. Shultz
6-7, Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp.
869 (D. Ala. 1982), vacated mem. op. (Feb. 27, 1984).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976).
123. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 4(i).

124. One might also conclude that the absence of the translation requirement in sections
1608(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(2) also demonstrate the non-constitutional nature of the requirement. In these sections, however, the foreign state has in some way agreed to a form of service.
Thus, even if due process required translations, the agreements contemplated in these sections
would constitute a waiver of this requirement.
125. SMIT, supra note 2, at 66 n.107.
126. 561 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982), vacated mem. op. (Feb. 27, 1984), dismissed (Oct.
26, 1984).
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characters that had been largely unused for over twenty-five years because
the PRC has adopted a simplified written language. The defendant argued
that such characters did not constitute its official language. 127 In vacating the
default judgment, the court rejected this contention and held that the
official language had indeed been used, adding that the defendant had not
shown that using traditional characters made the documents incomprehensible. 128 The court's conclusion that the traditional characters were
the PRC's official language is debatable, but the introduction of a requirement of prejudice is unjustified. Such a consideration may be appropriate
under a due process analysis, but not in evaluating compliance with the
statute. This conclusion is consistent with the other distinctions between
literal compliance with the statute and compliance with due process noted
earlier.
In most cases, common sense is sufficient to determine which of several
unofficial languages to use. For instance, no statute makes English the
official language of Great Britain, but no one would doubt that, were the
translation requirement applicable,'1 29 the proper language to use would be
English. 130In cases of doubt, it is advisable to consult the State Department.
If the suit is against an agency or instrumentality and court-ordered service is
possible, plaintiffs should consider exploiting the court-ordered service
provision for purposes to obtain a ruling on the proper language for translation. Whenever doubt exists, plaintiffs should consider translating the documents into two languages to be safe if doing so is not too expensive.
The accuracy of the translations necessary to meet the statute has been
addressed only in Jackson. At a minimum, the three documents that are
translated must perform the constitutional function of affording reasonable
notice of the suit and the opportunity to defend. Since the translation itself is
only a courtesy and not constitutionally required, 131 the translations normally would not be a consideration in the due process analysis. It is conceivable, however, that the translations could be so affirmatively misleading and
so deviate from the English versions that they could cause confusion sufficient to violate due process standards. It is important to emphasize that
with respect to due process claims, not only must the translation be inaccurate, but, unlike with the preferable statutory analysis, the foreign state
must be prejudiced thereby and must allege this in its motion to dismiss.
Foreign relations considerations suggest that courts should give foreign
127. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b), at 4, Jackson v. People's Republic of China, mem. op. (Feb. 27,
1984) [hereinafter cited as PRC Memorandum).
128. Jackson, mem. op. at 7 & n.6.
129. Since Great Britain is a party to the Hague Convention, it would be served under
§ 1608(a)(1) or (2), and its instrumentalities would be served under § 1608(b)(1) or (2).
130. See D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 4-5 (1963).

131. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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states the benefit of the doubt in close cases. Moreover, the problem is the
plaintiff's fault, and, unless the statute of limitations has run, the mistakes
may be corrected and the documents re-served.
The statute appears to require the translations to do more than merely
satisfy the minimum due process standard, at least when a notice of suit is
required. The committee reports described the function of this document as
follows:
A "notice of suit" as used in this section would advise a foreign state of the legal
proceeding, it would explain the legal significance of the summons, complaint and
service, and it would indicate what steps are available under or required by U.S.
law in order to defend the action. In short, it would provide an introductory
explanation
to a foreign state that may be unfamiliar with U.S. law or pro32
cedures. 1
This is obviously more detailed than what due process requires. 133 The
translation of the notice of suit must be adequate to meet these goals, or at
least not be so misleading and inconsistent with the English version that
these purposes are not achieved.
The case in which the translations come closest to violating the statute is
Jackson v. PRC.1 3 4 In that case, numerous material mistranslations occurred in the complaint, 135 the notice of suit, 136 and the notice of entry of
132. House Report, supra, note 4 at 24-25; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 24.
133. See supra text accompanying note 77.
134. 550 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Ala. 1982), vacated mem. op. (Feb. 27, 1984), dismissed (Oct.
26, 1984).
135. See PRC Memorandum, supra note 17, appendix 8, at 9-12, 16-20 (affidavit of l-Chuan
Chen) [hereinafter cited as Chen Affidavit]. For example, the term "action" was mistranslated
as "activity" or "operation"; thus the legal connotation of the term was lost. Id. at 9. The phrase
"Jurisdiction over the claims in this action" was mistranslated as "Jurisdiction appeals to this
activity (or operation's) announcement." Id. The term "sinking" in "sinking fund" was
mistranslated into the place name of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the PRC,
while "fund" was not translated. Id. at 10. "Bearer bonds" was mistranslated into "those
people who have bonds." Id. "Subject to service of process" was mistranslated as "produce
valid (or effective or efficacious) effect." Id. "Proceeds" became "lawsuit" or "litigation." Id.
"Pursuant to" became "to pursue," "seek," "chase," or "woo." Id. at 11. The crucial phrase
"constitutes a 'commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state'" was
rendered as "to set up (or to establish; to found) an activity for carrying out foreign commerce
in the United States." Id. "Hereby secured" was changed to "are all safe (or secure)." Id.
"Prayer for Relief" became "Consolations for the Prayers" or "Prayers' Consolations." Id. at
12. Finally, the monetary amount demanded, $100 million, was mistranslated into $220 million.
Id.
136. In the Notice of Suit, which is meant to explain the nature of the suit and U.S. law and
procedures to the foreign state, see supra notes 31, 132, and accompanying text, the phrase "is
certified to be a class action" was mistranslated as "a group to be guaranteed (or to be assured)
by." Id. at 12-13. "State immunity" was rendered as "tax exemption" at one point and at
another point as "tax exemption law of each State within the United States of America." Id. at
13. "Default Judgment" was mistranslated as "Judgment on breaking the contract (or violating
the treaty." Id. "Date of Default: Not Applicable" became "Date of Unpaid Dues: Will not
apply for it." Id. The term "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976" was expressed as
the "Foreign Country Autonomous Taxation Free-from-Tax Law." Id. at 13-14.
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default, 137 and the record disclosed no translation of the summons. 138 The
cumulative effect of the translation errors and the use of traditional rather
than modern Chinese characters arguably fell below statutory standards.
The court, however, rejected arguments based on the mistranslations because it believed that the documents sufficiently informed the PRC of the
nature of the claims and because it had not been shown
that the PRC was
39
prejudiced as a result of the alleged mistranslations.1
4. The Exclusivity of the Enumerated Service Methods
a. Compliance When All Enumerated Methods Fail
In a number of lawsuits growing out of the Iranian Revolution, courts

were faced with the question of how to serve Iran consistently with the FSIA
when all enumerated methods had been tried without success. The issue was
difficult to solve in cases against the foreign state itself because of legislative
history indicating that Congress intended the FSIA's service provisions to be
the exclusive means of serving foreign states 140 and because section 1608(a)
contains no backstop provision allowing a court to order a makeshift means
14 1
of service consistent with due process, as does section 1608(b).
i. Suits under Section 1608(a). Section 1608(a) contains no provision
for court-ordered service when all else fails. The last resort envisioned
by Congress was service through diplomatic channels 42 under section
1608(a)(4). Congress gave no indication of what should happen when diplomatic channels do not exist between the United States and the foreign
state.
Several cases against Iran presented courts with this dilemma. The first
137. In the "Notice of Entry of Default," the name of the document was translated as
"Notice of Default Judgment." Id. at 14. Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedurean entry of
default is issued and then a default judgment is entered. See FED. R. Civ. PROC. 55. Under the
FSIA the court may enter a default simply for failure to appear, but it may not issue a default
judgment until after a hearing at which the plaintiff must prove its right to relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608(e) (1976). Stating that an actual default judgment had occurred, therefore, materially
affected what the PRC was told about the nature of what had occurred (it had not yet incurred
liability) and its rights (a hearing was yet to be held).
In addition, the term "Hukuang Railways Bearer Bonds" was mistranslated as "Gu Guan
(Valley [strategic] Pass) Railways Bond Bearers." Chen Affidavit, supra note 135, at 15.
"Identity of Other Parties" was expressed as "clear verification of other relations." Id. "Nature
of documents served" was mistranslated as "originally held documents." Id. Finally, the
English text "why the foreign state has been named, and relief requested" was expressed "why
the foreign government is the name [used here as a noun], and relieve [meaning remove]
complaint." Id. at 15-16.
138. PRC Memorandum, supra note 127, appendix 8, exhibits A & E. The file that the State
Department maintained for the Jackson case contained no translated summons. Id.
139. Mem. op. at 7. The court did, however, regard the missing translation of the summons
as a sufficient basis for setting aside the default judgment. Id. at 7-8.
140. See House Report, supra note 4, at 23-24; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 23.
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)-(b) (1976).
142. For a discussion of the meaning of "diplomatic channels," see supra note 35.
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of these was Electronic Data Systems Corp. (EDS) v. Social Security Orga-

nization of Iran, 143 which involved claims against both Iran and Iranian
agencies and instrumentalities. In EDS, the plaintiffs argued that:
(1) certain earlier court orders ordering the plaintiffs to make service
covered the claim against Iran as well as claims against the Iranian agencies
and instrumentalities, and (2) their attempts to serve Iran should be
deemed sufficient because Iran had actual notice of the action and of the
specific relief sought. 144 The court held first that the earlier orders did not
purport to apply to the claim against Iran and second that actual notice was
not enough to constitute effective service because no applicable section of
the FSIA had been satisfied.145 Although the court recognized that the FSIA
was intended to help plaintiffs obtain redress in the courts, the court emphasized that "Congress intended section 1608 to provide the exclusive procedures for services upon foreign states," 146 and considered this factor overriding. Since no evidence disclosed that the plaintiffs had attempted to serve
Iran under section 1608(a), the court did not need to face squarely the issue
of what happens when all else fails. The opinion, however, suggests that the
FSIA embodies the exclusive methods by which foreign states may be
served.
The next case to deal with this situation was New England Merchants
National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co. 147 In that

case the Iranian Government failed to sign the return receipts and return
148
them by the Iranian postal service as required under section 1608(a)(3).
Under the next alternative, section 1608(a)(4), no return receipts are required, but diplomatic channels are, and they were lacking in this case. The
plaintiffs, therefore, moved the court to order a substitute form of service.
Iran opposed this motion, arguing- that section 1608(a) does not authorize
such service and that Congress was certainly aware that international unrest
might render service impossible at times and intentionally made no provision for service under such circumstances. 149 Iran interpreted Congress'
silence as evidence that the FSIA was 50meant to contain the exclusive
methods of service upon foreign states.1
The court rejected this argument and held (1) that the FSIA does not
preclude substitute forms of service and (2) that substitute service is indeed
authorized under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.151 With respect to
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

No. CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1979).
Id., slip. op. at 9.
Id.at 10-11.
Id.at 10 (citing House Report, supra note 4, at 24).
495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id.at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the FSIA, the court reasoned that since, like section 1608(b)(3)(C), section
1608(a)(4) requires no signed return receipt for service to be complete,
"service through diplomatic channels was intended to serve the same purpose as the substitute service provision in the section dealing with agencies
and instrumentalities," 1' 52 section 1608(b)(3)(C). "The only logical conclusion to be drawn," stated the court, "is that Congress did not seek to cover
the problem of effecting service upon a foreign government should diplomatic channels be closed."'' 53 The court found nothing in the Act or its legislative history prohibiting a court from
recognizing a mode of service when all
54
prescribed methods have failed.1
The court then looked for specific authority for fashioning a substitute
form of service and found it in rule 4(e) and (i) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,1 55 which authorizes a court to fashion a mode of extraterritorial
service if such service is authorized by a state or federal statute. 56 The court
concluded that since the FSIA (1) authorizes service upon Iran and (2) does

152. Id. at 79.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(e) Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. Whenever a
statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a
summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of
or found within the state in which the district court is held, service may be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision
therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute
or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a
summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of
or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or
defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his
property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(i) Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country.
(1) Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule
authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the
district court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a foreign country, it is
also sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made: (A) in the manner
prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of
its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a
letter rogatory, when service in either case is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or
(C) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any
form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the
court to the Party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C)
or (E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of
age or who is designated by order of the district court or by the foreign court. On request,
the clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for transmission to the person or the
foreign court or officer who will make the service.
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nothing to restrict "the court's otherwise unfettered authority" under rule
4(e) and (i) to fashion a substitute mode of service, substituted service was
authorized under the circumstances. 57 The court concluded that Iran
already had actual notice of the pendency and nature of the suit, but
nevertheless ordered the plaintiffs to (1) telex the summons and notice of
suit and mail a copy of the pleadings under separate cover, (2) serve a copy
of the pleadings upon Iran's counsel, and (3) file an affidavit with the court
1 58
reciting compliance with the above measures.
The last major Iranian decision, In re Related Iranian Cases, 159 relied
heavily upon New England Merchants.160 This case also involved frustrated
attempts to serve Iran under section 1608(a)(3). 16' The court phrased the
issue as "whether Congress' failure to specify a particular mode of service in
instances where diplomatic channels are closed amounts to a prohibition on
this court's inherent power to order a form of service of process which
comports with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirements of due
162

process."

The court determined that although the FSIA's legislative history describes section 1608's procedures as "exclusive,"
when this part of the legislative history is read together with the language of
§1608(a) and considered in context with the overall purpose of the statute it is
reasonable to conclude that the FSIA service provisions were meant to be exclusive in circumstances of normal diplomatic relations provided for in the Act, and
were not intended to thwart a court's ability to respond to anomalous situations
like the present Iranian affair. This interpretation is supported by the presumption

of rationality that applies to statutory construction. If we accepted defendants'
view that Congress has shielded Iran from amenability to service of process by
barring the desired court order, we would have to accept that Congress acted
irrationally by providing greater advantages to a nation that had severed relations
with the United States and refused to cooperate with litigation, than a nation with
which the United States enjoys good relations. For these reasons we must agree

with Judge Duffy's analysis [in New England Merchants] and conclude that the
FSIA does not preclude issuance of a court 63order for serving Iran in light of the
special facts of the cases before the court. 1
The court then concluded that it had "the inherent power to fashion a mode
of service not covered and not inconsistent with a specific statute or rule"
164
and that the FSIA did not limit this power under the circumstances,
157. 495 F. Supp. at 80.
158. Id.at 81.

159. No. C-79-3542 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1980).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
Engrs.,

See supra note 149.
Id., slip. op. at 3.
Id.at 4.
Id.at 4-5.
Id. at 5. The court relied upon two pre-FSIA cases, Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco
Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975), and Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece,

compare footnote 43, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
WINTER 1985

74

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

stating that "the Federal Rules are designed to dovetail with specific statutes
authorizing service in order to insure that no gaps occur.'

165

The court

ordered the plaintiffs to send by telex or, failing that, cable, the summons
and notice of suit, and to send the pleadings in English and Farsi by return
receipt mail to each defendant
not yet so served, and to serve the pleadings
166
upon Iran's counsel.
In the final Iranian case, International School Service v. Government of
Iran,167 the plaintiffs again failed to effect service under section 1608(a)(3)
and applied for an order authorizing service by telex. The court granted this
order in a short opinion virtually devoid of analysis, the court noting only
that court-ordered service by168
telex could not prejudice Iran because it could
later object to such service.
The holdings of New England Merchants, Related Iranian Cases, and
InternationalSchool Service stand for the proposition that whenever service
cannot be effected under section 1608(a), it may be done under rule 4(i),
which effectively creates by judicial fiat a section 1608(b)(3)(C) in suits
against foreign states under section 1608(a). 169 The text of FSIA and its
legislative history, however, indicate that service outside the terms of the
FSIA, including court-ordered service upon foreign states and political
subdivisions, was not authorized by Congress. If this is true, then whether
courts otherwise have power to fashion ad hoc methods of service under
rules 4(i) and 83 is irrelevant; Congress took this power away for purposes of
service under the FSIA. That is, the FSIA preempts these other rules.
First, the statute on its face allows court-ordered service in section
1608(b) and not under section 1608(a). Had Congress contemplated service
as being available under rule 4(i), there would be no need for section
1608(b)(3)(C). Thus the application of inclusio unis es exclusio alterius
indicates that court-ordered service is unavailable in suits against the foreign
state under section 1608(a). Second, the unambiguous language of exclusivity in the committee reports indicates that no further procedures for service
are authorized. Not only is section 1608 as a whole described as setting forth
"the exclusive procedures with respect to service on a foreign state or its
political subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities," 170 but section 1608(a)
165. Id. at 6, (citing United States v. Rockhill, 9 F.R.D. 696 (D. Ore. 1950)); 4 C. WRIGHT&
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1117, at 483-84 (1969).
166. Slip. op. at 8.
167. 505 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1981).
168. Id. at 179.
169. The result in Related Iranian Cases is particularly unwarranted because the court
ignored binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit holding that rule 4 does not authorize service
upon foreign states. Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engrs., Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir.
1975). Although the Ninth Circuit did authorize such service under rule 83, id., the court in
Related Iranian Cases never relied upon rule 83.
170. House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 24.
A.
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is described as setting forth "the exclusive procedures for service on a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof,"' 71 and section 1608(a)(4) is
described as a method of "last resort.

' 172

Although Congress probably did

believe that section 1608(a)(4) would cover all situations, the fact that it
does not cover all situations does not thereby create a gap to be filled by
judicial legislation. Third, Congress did consider the relationship between
the FSIA and rule

4,173

and ended up making no provision for its use. The

great variations in the methods of service under rule 4 prior to the FSIA,
which resulted in uncertainty and forum shopping, were a result that the
FSIA's service provisions were specifically designed to avoid. 174 Before the
FSIA was passed, the courts were split over whether rule 4 authorized

district courts to arrange for service upon foreign states. 175 Congress
apparently intended to resolve this controversy by setting up an exclusive
scheme for service upon foreign states. 176 Finally, given Congress' apparent
sensitivity to the need for greater delicacy in suits against foreign states
themselves as opposed to their agencies and instrumentalities,

77

it is likely

that Congress decided not to entrust courts with the power to decide directly
how foreign states and their political subdivisions are to be served.

178

Thus, section 1608 was not meant to "dovetail" with rule 4. To permit
171. House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 23. In contrast, the
reports do not describe the methods in § 1608(b) as exclusive. Apparently, Congress believed
this was unnecessary since court-ordered service can cover all contingencies. Thus, the presence of the exclusivity language with regard to § 1604(a) suggests that Congress intended to
emphasize that no methods other than those in § 1604(a) may be used upon foreign states and
political subdivisions.
172. See House Report, supra note 4, at 23; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 23.
173. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and GovernmentalRelations of the Comm. on the Judiciary,94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1976) (statement of J. Roderick Heller).
174. Id.
175. Id. Mr. Heller stated: "The proposed legislation would in effect end that and the
uncertainty it engenders. I don't believe there is a need to amend the Federal Rules." Id.
(emphasis added).
Congress considered both whether to amend rule 4 to reflect the passage of § 1608 and
whether simply to amend rule 4 and not pass § 1608, id. at 86, but did neither. Arguably,
Congress was leaving it to the courts to decide whether service could occur pursuant to rule 4. It
is more likely, however, that Congress decided that passing § 1608 mooted the issue of whether
serving foreign states could be served under rule 4 because § 1608's provisions are exclusive. See
id. at 90.
176. The commentators have uniformly concluded that the methods in § 1608 are exclusive.
7B J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1608 (1983); 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3662 (1982 Supp.) (The Act "is intended to
preempt any other state or federal law."); Kane, supra note 2, at 402; Note, supra note 2, at
368. Although Kane concluded that § 1608 was meant to be exclusive, she concluded that the
court-ordered service in New England Merchants was "justified." Kane, supra note 2, at 402.
No legal basis for such exception in view of Congress' intent was articulated, however.
177. See Note, supra note 2, at 361-62. For instance, the notice of suit that is required under
§ 1608(a) but not under § 1608(b) evidences this increased concern.
178. Id. at 362-63.
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such loose application of the statute would frustrate several purposes behind
establishing section 1608. Congress sought to establish a single statute that
would govern the procedures for suits against foreign states to assure uniformity and reduce foreign relations tensions. Disallowing such service
under difficult circumstances does, of course, compromise the goal of providing effective remedies against foreign states. Congress, however,
deemed the law as written adequate to achieve this goal. The way to deal
with this problem is not to bend the rules beyond recognition but to persuade Congress to change them. Until then, as the court indicated in EDS,
the law must be applied as written.
Curiously, it appears that the efforts of the courts in the Iranian cases to
avoid the FSIA may have been unnecessary and their holdings erroneous for
the simple reason that the State Department's regulations provide for
service through diplomatic channels of a third country if direct diplomatic
channels are lacking and the defendant foreign state has authorized the third
country to represent its interests in the United States. 179 Although the New
England Merchants court did not address this option, the court in Related
Iranian Cases did and rejected it on the ground that it had not been shown
that service would actually be accomplished or that Iran had authorized a
third country to represent its interests. 80 In the Iranian cases, however,
such service might have been effected through Swiss channels.18' The first
rationale of no guarantee of actual receipt is unpersuasive because the same
could be said of the statutory methods in that and many other cases. In short,
such service was worth the attempt in view of the alternative of bending the
statute beyond its intended meaning. In such difficult situations it might be
appropriate for the State Department to communicate its evaluation of the
situation to the court as well. Since the third-country option does not exist
when the foreign state has not authorized a third state to represent its
interests in the United States, however, indirect diplomatic channels may be
totally lacking in other cases.
ii. Suits under Section 1608(b). Court-ordered service is expressly authorized by section 1608(b)(3)(C) when the methods in section 1608(b)(1)-(2)
are unavailable.' 82 Whether a particular method is acceptable in a particular
case is determined by (1) whether it satisfies due process and the FSIA by
being reasonably calculated to provide actual notice 183 and (2) whether it is

179. 22 C.F.R. § 93.1(c)(3) (1983). Using a third country may be employed to effect service
when diplomatic channels are closed between the two countries concerned. The United States
has used this method of service in settling disputes with Cuba. Note, supra note 2, at 367.
180. No. C-79-3542, slip. op. at 6.
181. Note, supra note 2, at 367 n.71.
182. The other two methods specified in § 1608(b)(3), however, need not be unavailable
before the court may fashion service under § 1608(b)(3)(C).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3) (1976).
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"consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made. ' 184 The
first requirement contemplates a normal due process analysis and needs no
further elaboration. The second requirement, however, can present unique
challenges to a court in any case. It is tedious and often impossible to find
specific, affirmative authority in foreign law for a particular method of
service. In recognition of this problem, the courts have intrepreted the
requirement as allowing a method of service so long as the applicable foreign
law does not affirmatively prohibit it. 185 The principle does not mean that a
court should turn a blind eye to the requirements of the foreign state's law,
but only that a primafacieshowing of conformity with such law may prevent
dismissal. Thus, it is unlikely that a foreign agency or instrumentality will be
prejudiced by a facially invalid attempt at service pursuant to its or a third
state's law. Since the defendant is only an agency or instrumentality rather
than the sovereign itself, political problems are likely to be minimal. If the
agency or instrumentality appears, showing the invalidity of service under
local law can be viewed as one way of carrying its normal burden of showing
that it is entitled to immunity. If a default is entered, however, then section
1608(e) should require a stronger showing by the plaintiff that service
conformed with the applicable foreign law before a default judgment is
entered.186
This reading of the statute appears permissible and appropriately places
the burden of showing non-compliance upon the party in the best position to
determine the content of the applicable foreign law. Although the committee reports are equivocal on this point, 87 such a result is consistent with the
purpose of the FSIA to facilitate the commencement of lawsuits against
188
foreign states.
b. Exclusivity in State Court Prior to Removal
The FSIA provides for the removal to federal district court, at the discretion of the foreign state, of suits against foreign states brought in state
courts. 189 A plaintiff might file suit in state court utilizing local service
procedures in an attempt to circumvent the FSIA's scheme,' 9° though no
184. Id. § 1608(b)(3)(C).
185. In re Related Iranian Cases, No. C-79-3542, slip. op. at 7; New England Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. at 78-79.
186. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
187. The committee reports first state that the requirement was meant to take "into account
the fact that the laws of foreign countries may prohibit the service in their country of judicial
documents by process servers in the United States," but then state that no court should direct
such physical delivery of the documents "unless it is clearly consistent" with the law of the
foreign state. House Report, supra, note 4, at 25 (emphasis added); Senate Report, supra note
4, at 25 (emphasis added).
188. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).
190. See Kane, supra note 2, at 400-01.
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reported decision evidences any such attempt to date. Although there is no
explicit prohibition of this tactic in the Act or the legislative history of the
removal provision, 91 the intent of Congress in passing the FSIA and the
practice of courts in other areas of unusual federal interest indicate that no
such maneuver should be permitted.
First, permitting service under state long-arm statutes prior to removal
would clearly frustrate Congress' intent to reduce uncertainty and establish
a uniform body of law governing suits against foreign sovereigns. 92 The
removal provision itself was designed to further this purpose. 193 Second, the
language of the committee reports describing the service methods of section
1608 as exclusive is not limited to federal courts.' 94 Third, since federal
courts consider issues affecting foreign relations matters of special federal
interest, they prefer that such issues be adjudicated under a uniform federal
standard. 195 Service upon a foreign sovereign presents such an issue. Thus,
it appears that federal policies must prevail over any burdens imposed on
state courts by having to follow unfamiliar federal service procedures.
IV. Possible Improvements in the FSIA's Service Provisions
A.

COURT-ORDERED SERVICE UPON FOREIGN STATES

The statutory gap exposed in the Iranian cases should be closed to
eliminate the risk that courts again will engage in the type of legal gymnastics
performed in those cases. The available evidence suggests that Congress
meant the FSIA to provide the exclusive provisions governing service
against foreign states, but also that it did not foresee situations in which
these provisions would not be sufficient to advance the FSIA's goal of
providing an effective means of redress against foreign states. 196 The State
Department regulation allowing for service through a third country authorized to represent the defendant foreign state cannot cover all cases in which
diplomatic ties are lacking because not all states have or are willing to
appoint such representatives. Expanding the regulation to allow service
through a third country even absent authorization by the defendant foreign
state, or even reliance upon it, compromises the exclusivity of the statu191. See House Report, supra note 4, at 32-33; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 32.
192. House Report, supra note 4, at 6; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 8; Kane, supra note 2,
at 401.
193. The committee reports state: "In view of the potential sensitivity of actions against
foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law in this area, it is
important to give foreign states clear authority to remove to a Federal forum actions brought
against them in state courts." House Report, supra note 4, at 32; Senate Report, supra note 4,
at 32.
194. House Report, supra note 4, at 24; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 24.
195. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964) (scope of act
of state doctrine must be determined by federal standard because of foreign relations considerations).
196. See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
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tory provisions and may go beyond what Congress intended in section
1608(a)(4). Thus, a new statutory provision is needed to fill the current gap
on the statute and regulations. The twin congressional goals of exclusivity
and providing effective redress can be fulfilled simply by adding a fifth
option to section 1608(a) allowing for court-ordered service if all other
methods prove unavailing. So long as the provision incorporates a requirement that service be consistent with the foreign state's law, there is little
basis for fearing foreign relations complications from court-ordered service.
Although the danger of provoking tensions is normally greater in a suit
against the foreign state itself than against its instrumentalities, such a
provision's potential adverse impact upon U.S. relations with the defendant
state would be insignificant since it would apply only when diplomatic ties
are lacking.
B.

MINIMIZING TRANSLATION ISSUES

Translation issues should be kept to a minimum. A judge is not in a good
position to evaluate the adequacy of the translation. The problem inevitably
degenerates into a battle of translation experts, and even when an error can
be ascertained it is difficult to assess its impact upon the foreign state's
understanding of the lawsuit. In the end, the squabble could frustrate the
purpose of the translation requirement of rendering U.S. lawsuits against
the foreign state less bothersome.
Therefore, it is important to find ways to minimize the possibility of
translation issues arising. The goal would be not to render the translations
immune from attack by a presumption, but merely to prevent sloppy work
from ever being filed. The current practice of having the translator certify
the translation as accurate does not mean that it is accurate, and thus this
procedure does not solve the problem.
A starting point is to recognize that the judicial code already provides a
qualification process for interpreters who shall serve at trials in each judicial
district. 197 It bears investigating whether the FSIA and this statute could be
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1976). This statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall establish a
program to facilitate the use of interpreters in courts of the United States.
(b) The Director shall prescribe, determine, and certify the qualifications of persons who
may serve as certified interpreters in courts of the United States in bilingual proceedings...
and in so doing, the Director shall consider the education, training, and experience of those
persons. The Director shall maintain a current master list of all interpreters certified by the
Director and shall report annually on the frequency of requests for, and the use and
effectiveness of, interpreters. The Director shall prescribe a schedule of fees for services
rendered by interpreters.
(c) Each United States district court shall maintain on file in the office of the clerk of court
a list of all persons who have been certified as interpreters, including bilingual interpreters by
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in accordance with the
certification program established pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1976).
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amended to require the translations to be done by this group of persons, or
whether an analogous group could be qualified for such translations. 198
Alternatively, the FSIA or State Department regulations could simply
require a plaintiff to obtain court approval to retain a particular translator
upon presentation of that person's qualifications. With any of these options,
the plaintiff could be given the benefit of strong but not irrebuttable presumption of adequacy.
It would be too burdensome for the State Department to become involved
in the translation process either by certifying the translation as correct to
create an irrebuttable presumption of correctness or by performing and
certifying the translation itself. Creating the irrebuttable presumption
necessary to make such a certification process work creates the risk that a
certified document could still be mistranslated and yet not be subject to
challenge. This could embarrass the State Department, irritate the foreign
state, and raise due process concerns. The FSIA was intended to relieve the
State Department from bearing the brunt of a foreign state's chafe. Giving it
responsibility for the translations would be a step backwards.
In a default situation, a plaintiff must demonstrate its right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court, which includes a showing that service was
adequate. It is in this situation that the dangers from a poor translation are
most acute; indeed, a poor translation could be a reason why the defendant
state did not appear. Therefore, it would be appropriate to require a
court-appointed translator, or a court-approved translator other than the
original translator, to certify the accuracy of the translations before a default
judgment is entered.
Whenever the method of service requires a notice of suit to be served, a
translated copy of the FSIA must be served as part thereof. 199 This requirement is burdensome and costly. 2°° Since, unlike the other documents to be
translated, its form will be identical from lawsuit to lawsuit for each language, it would be helpful for the State Department to keep and make
available to plaintiffs at minimal cost files of the translations for use in
subsequent lawsuits. Although the first plaintiff to serve a particular foreign
state under the applicable subsections will carry the greatest burden, the
problem will disappear over time, and the time and expense saved in the
long run would further the congressional purpose of facilitating the institution of lawsuits against foreign states.
198. The choice between these two alternatives would rest on whether the interpreters
qualified under § 1827 would also be competent to translate legal documents. Interpreters who
are fluent at translating witnesses' testimony are not necessarily competent to perform specialized translations, nor is a good legal translator necessarily competent to do interpreting work.
199. 22 C.F.R. § 93.2(3) (1983).
200. See supra text accompanying note 125. Professor Smit has proposed eliminating the
translation requirement because of its expense. SMIT, supra note 2, at 66 n.107.
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One might be tempted to remedy the translation problem by providing, as
is often done in treaties written in two or more languages, that in case of
ambiguity the English version of the documents shall be deemed authoritative. Although this method of heading off translation disputes befits the
notion that the translation is a convenience and not a due process requirement, establishing such a rule would vitiate the translation requirement and
invite sloppiness without necessarily resolving any questions raised in the
defendant's mind by an inconsistency between the two texts.
In view of the costs and difficulties that the translation requirement can
create, it is not out of place to consider whether this provision's benefits are
worth all the trouble. After all, the translation is a convenience, not a due
process requirement.2 °' It appears that the provision should be retained. A
translation, if accurate, does further reduce the chances that the defendant
state's rights may be jeopardized. In domestic suits, the legal system is
willing to expend great resources to protect against marginal infringements
of individuals' rights even when guilt or liability is not in doubt. Similar, and
perhaps greater, deference is due a foreign state, whose fate in a lawsuit may
come back to haunt U.S. foreign relations in untold tangible and intangible
ways. The benefits of making U.S. lawsuits less painful for foreign states are
often intangible and incapable of measurement. Providing a translation of
the relevant documents eliminates a possible irritant and excuse for retaliation, and helps facilitate the gradual subjection of foreign states to the rule
of law. Thoughtful individuals introduced the translation requirement, and
it should be disposed of only upon clear evidence that it is not having its
desired effect.
C.

VERIFYING WHAT DOCUMENTS WERE SERVED

In Jackson v. PRC,20 2 an issue developed over whether the plaintiffs ever
served a translation of the summons. It was this service issue that constituted
a ground for setting the default judgment aside.20 3 Such an issue should
never be allowed to arise. When the State Department reviews documents
from the court before they are sent under section 1608(a)(4), it is required to
make sure all the necessary documents are present and to notify the court if
they are not. 2 °4 Unfortunately, that the Department has a duty to make sure
all the required documents exist before they are sent does not mean that
they all exist or were all sent. In fact, under the current system, no one with a
knowledge of the defendant state's official language examines the docu201.
202.
1984).
203.
204.

See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
550 F. Supp. 869 (D. Ala. 1982), vacated mem. op. (Feb. 27, 1984), dismissed (Oct. 26,
Mem. op. at 7-8.
22 C.F.R. § 93.1(b) (1983).
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translations exist or are sent. This practice probably does not comply with
the current regulations. In order to achieve the desired level of care and
certainty, a more specific regulation requiring the Department to produce a
document is probably necessary. The regulations could be amended to
require the Department to certify that someone with knowledge of the
foreign state's official language has examined the documents to make sure
all the necessary translated documents exist, that all the necessary documents were sent to the defendant in the case, and that it has sent no
others.20 5 This certification would not preclude all questions relating to what

documents were served or received from arising, but it would deter frivolous
allegations of non-receipt or non-service from being made by establishing
rebuttable presumptions that the State Department's assertions are correct
and that what was sent was received. 2 °6
D.

PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING OF SECTION

1608

One commentator has proposed eliminating (1) the translation requirement, (2) the separate provisions for foreign states and agencies and instrumentalities, (3) any reference to foreign law, and (4) the hierarchical set
of service methods, and instead providing that a foreign state may be served
in the manner a foreign state is served under the Federal Rules and that for
such purpose the head of the defendant state's foreign ministry shall be
regarded as a managing or general agent of the foreign state.20 7 A simpler
provision would have an inherent appeal and would more closely resemble
the service provisions of the British State Immunity Act 20 8 and the European Convention on State Immunity. 20 9 The Canadian State Immunity Act,
205. One might gather from negative implication that the Department would have notified
the clerk of the court pursuant to 22 C.F.R. § 93. 1(b) if all the documents were not sent, but this
did not prevent the issue from arising in Jackson. It would better advance the cause of certainty
to affirmatively require the Department to certify in some way that all required translations
were in the file were dispatched and that no others were sent.
206. As a matter of tidiness, one further change not worthy of textual discussion appears in
order. Section 1608(a)(4) of the statute should be amended to reflect the transfer of the
Director of Special Consular Services' functions to Overseas Citizens Services on November 17,
1978. Other statutes are updated to reflect changes in the makeup of agencies. More importantly, it is wise to minimize all potential for confusion to foreign states and U.S. plaintiffs.
207. SMIT, supra note 2, at 66.
208. Section 12(1) of the United Kingdom's statute provides, quite simply:
12.-(1) Any writ or other document required to be served for instituting proceedings
against a State shall be served by being transmitted through the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State and service shall be deemed to have been
effected when the writ or document is received at the Ministry.
State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978). Section 12(6) provides
that this procedure is not applicable if the state has agreed to another manner of service. Id.
§ 12(6).
209. Article 16(2)-(3) of the European Convention provides:
2. The competent authorities of the State of the forum shall transmit
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however, closely resembles the FSIA in having a hierarchical service system
and in distinguishing between the state itself and its agencies and

instrumentalities. 2 10 This similarity should carry some weight because Canada had five years to observe the FSIA in action and still passed a similar
service provision. The British, on the other hand, because of their EEC

membership, could not deviate materially from the scheme of the European
Convention.
Other factors also suggest that at this point in time it would be better not

to perform a wholesale revision of section 1608. First, except for the Iranian
cases and perhaps Alberti, the evidence does not suggest that litigants or the
courts find section 1608 too difficult to apply. Second, Congress, the State
Department, and the Justice Department considered and rejected the
approach of rule 4 for a number of reasons. It hoped to promote the use of
contractual service provisions, further the interest in joining international
service conventions, and to set forth clearly the relationship of such forms of
service with the remaining methods of service. It also sought to reduce the
sources of uncertainty that had irritated foreign states by providing a detailed statute with built-in procedural protections and courtesies.
-the

original or a copy of the document by which the proceedings are instituted.
-a copy of any judgment given by default against a State which was defendant in the
proceedings, through the diplomatic channel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
defendant State for onward transmission, where appropriate to the competent authority.
These documents shall be accompanied, if necessary, by a translation into the official
language, or one of the official languages of the defendant State.
3. Service of the documents referred to in paragraph 2 is deemed to have been effected by
their receipt by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
European Convention on State Immunity, art. 16(2)-(3), May 16, 1972, Additional Protocol,
74 Europ. T.S. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).
210. Section 9(1)-(5) of the Canadian State Immunity Act provides:
9. (1) Service of an originating document on a foreign state, other than on an agency of
the foreign state, may be made
(a) in any manner agreed on by the state;
(b) in accordance with any international Convention to which the state is a party; or
(c) in the manner provided in subsection (2).
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(C), anyone wishing to serve an originating document on a foreign state may deliver a copy of the document, in person or by registered mail,
to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs or a person designated by him for the
purpose, who shall transmit it to the foreign state.
(3) Service of an originating document on an agency of a foreign state may be made
(a) in any manner agreed on by the agency;
(b) in accordance with any international Convention applicable to the agency; or
(c) in accordance with any applicable rules of court.
(4) Where service on an agency of a foreign state cannot be made under subsection (3), a
court may, by order, direct how service is to be made.
(5) Where service of an originating document is made in the manner provided in subsection (2), service of the document shall be deemed to have been made on the day that the
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs or a person designated by him pursuant to
subsection (2) certifies to the relevant court that the copy of the document has been
transmitted to the foreign state.
State Immunity Act, ch. 95, § 9(1)-(5), 1980-81-82 Can. Stat.
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Finally, there is a merit in continuity for its own sake. Even if the
approach of rule 4 deserved more serious attention during the Act's passage,
the burden of proof necessary to justify major changes increases over time.
Absent compelling evidence that section 1608 is fundamentally inadequate
or U.S. ratification of a future multilateral state immunity convention with
inconsistent service provisions, there is insufficient justification for performing drastic surgery. Now that foreign states are becoming accustomed to the
procedural workings of the Act, a major change in the Act's central procedural provision risks provoking the kind of irritation that the Act was
designed to minimize.
V. Conclusion
The service provisions of the FSIA seek a balance between the need to
facilitate redress against foreign states and the danger that doing so may
cause international frictions and retaliation. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of strict compliance to prevent the type of foreign relations complications that not only the service provisions, but the rest of the Act was
designed to avoid. If a claimant does not comply with section 1608, the only
consequence in most cases will be that the defendant must be re-served. If a
court creates a foreign relations incident in the name of facilitating judicial
redress, the international and legal wounds will remain long after the
particular case is put to rest.
Suits against foreign states touch political nerves not only in the foreign
state, but also raise sensitive issues at home. Often the particular state or the
nature of its activities are the subject of strong feelings which no judge can
block out completely, as in the Iranian cases. The opinions in such cases are
immediately suspect at home and abroad as being result oriented, and
governed by political motives rather than the rule of law. When the opportunity arises to reduce the cause for such suspicions and provide rules of law,
the moment should be seized. In order to maintain the integrity of the FSIA
and U.S. courts, it is essential to create both the impression and the reality
that the FSIA is being followed to the letter and that the courts are applying
a law rather than conducting foreign policy.
The FSIA's service provisions on balance have proven workable and fair
when conscientiously applied. The courts, quite properly, have generally
read the statute strictly, the only significant exception being the courtordered service in the Iranian cases. The minor reforms suggested in this
article merely represent ways to close certain gaps that Congress did not
anticipate or to otherwise streamline the process and prevent petty disputes
from arising. The larger task of interpreting the statute consistently with
congressional intent and with an appreciation for the effects of court decisions on foreign relations lies with the courts.
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